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The material in this article was presented 18 June 1991, at the Powerhouse Museum in Sydney, 
to a conference on the establishment and role of an national environmental protection agency 
which the Australian Government is presently considering. The authors argue that a federal 
environmental protection authority, equipped with enforcement powers, is necessary if 




A national approach to environmental protection is the most effective way for Australia 
to protect its own environment and to contribute to the common cause of global 
environmental protection.[1] The centerpiece of this approach should be a federal 
environmental protection authority (EPA), able to deal with the issues which arise on 
a transboundary basis, both nationally and internationally. However, the powers of a 
national agency will need to be tailored to avoid conflict within the system of 
cooperative federalism in Australia. 
 
This article reviews constitutional tensions between federal and state government as 
they relate to several of the major international environmental conventions that bind 
Australia. The authors conclude that a federal authority, committed to enforcing 
Australia's international agreements to protect the environment, is the most effective 
means of addressing worldwide concern with the state of the natural world. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AUSTRALIA'S 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
A. International Environmental Treaties 
 
With the emergence of worldwide environmental consciousness in the early 1970s, 
Australia began to assume numerous international obligations regarding the 
environment. The federal government began to explore ways to meet these 
international obligations under national law and to exercise some influence over 
environmental matters and land use generally.[2] 
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Initially, the implementation of environmental treaties[3] was complicated by the fact 
the Australian Constitution does not repose any specific environmental protection 
powers in either the federal or state governments.[4] Authority for federal oversight of 
international treaties can be found in Section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, which gives 
the federal government power to legislate on matters relating to "external affairs," 
including environmental matters.[5] This power enables the implementation of treaty 
provisions through appropriate legislation.[6] The scope of this authority, however, has 
been a matter of dispute between state and federal governments.[7] 
 
A detailed analysis of Section 51(xxix) is beyond the ambit of this article.[8] It should 
be noted, however, that the High Court of Australia has recognized that environmental 
treaties ratified by Australia may impose international duties at a national level.[9] A 
federal Environmental Protection Authority with appropriate regulatory powers should 
be established to ensure that Australia maintains compliance with its international 
environmental obligations. 
 
There are now more than one thousand treaties that serve as sources for international 
environmental obligations.[10] Although Australia is not party to all of them, it has 
sizeable international commitments through treaties it has signed or implemented.[11] 
Further, this decade is likely to see a proliferation of international environmental law 
encouraged in large part by the United Nations Conference on Environment & 
Development (UNCED),[12] and increased governmental awareness of the seriousness 
of global environmental problems. 
 
While many environmental agreements are primarily worldwide in scope, it is 
important to note that Australia is becoming increasingly involved in environmental 
agreements and programs specifically tailored to the needs of the Pacific region.[13] 
While Australia has ratified all of these regional agreements, none of them have been 
implemented by Commonwealth legislation to date.[14] As important as these 
conventions are, the Action Plan For Managing the Environment of the South Pacific 
Region, adopted in 1986 and revised in 1991,[15] also provides significant measures 
for environmental protection in the region. The Plan is particularly important in the 
region as it provides for a variety of measures to promote environmental protection 
outside any legal framework.  This is important to international environmental 
protection because many South Pacific countries lack the resources and hence the 
inclination to enter into legally binding obligations. 
 
With a greater role likely to be played by the South Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme in the foreseeable future, due in large part to a considerable increase in 
funding from the World Bank in 1991, greater emphasis on regional environmental 
protection is likely. Australia's international obligations to implement environmental 
protection measures nationally under these treaties will need consideration. Australia 
already faces and will face greater obligations under international environmental law 
at the global and South Pacific regional level. How to effectively implement these 
obligations on a national basis must be considered. 
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B. Domestic Implementation of International Environmental Treaties 
 
As the scope and coverage of international environmental law progressively widens, 
the coordinated operation of treaty rights and obligations will be crucial in establishing 
an effective international legal order for the protection of the environment. Without an 
integrated application of effective national regulations, international environmental 
law is likely to become superfluous. 
 
The World Conservation Strategy, which has been adopted by Australia.[16] indicates 
 the suitability of Federal EPA oversight of international agreements on the 
environment. Principle 7 of the Strategy provides that: 
 
     [e]ach country should review and consolidate its legislation concerning living 
     resources to ensure that it provides sufficiently for conservation. Each 
     country should also review--and if necessary strengthen--its capacity to 
     implement its conservation legislation, both existing and required. Ideally, a 
     commitment to conserve the country's living resources should be 
     incorporated in the constitution or other appropriate legal instrument.[17] 
 
It is plain that the focus of Principle 7 is on an integrated national implementation of 
the Strategy. Indeed, Principle 7 exhorts nations to embody their commitment to 
conservation in their constituent documents. 
 
At the domestic level, the implications of an effective structure of international 
environmental law are considerable. This is especially so in the context of Australia's 
unique brand of "cooperative federalism."[18] The Australian Constitution splits 
legislative authority between the Commonwealth and State governments. Under 
constitutional tradition, the Commonwealth government has been accorded the power 
to enter into treaties[19] and regulate foreign affairs. Even so, depending on the 
specific subject area covered and the constitutional division of powers, the states may 
still retain legislative jurisdiction over the subject area of a particular treaty.[20] This 
has important implications in the area of international environmental treaties. Foremost, 
it has the potential to limit the ability of a federal EPA to engage in effective domestic 
regulation. 
 
The Australia Constitution contains scant reference to environmental concerns[21] and 
does not expressly confer jurisdiction of environmental issues on the federal 
government.[22] Therefore, in theory, environmental regulation should be subject to 
exclusive state control, because powers not specifically set forth in the Constitution are 
reserved to the states.[23] This has, however, not been proven to be true. 
 
A trilogy of cases decided by the High Court of Australia during the 1980s,[24] 
approving the use of the foreign affairs power to implement international 
environmental agreements, appears to have conclusively resolved the issue regarding 
the general power to legislate on such agreements in favor of the Commonwealth. 
Commonwealth v. Tasmanian Dam[25] held that the Commonwealth has the power 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Anton, Kohout & Pain     NATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA                P age 4 
 
 
under Section 51(xxix) to enact legislation implementing international environmental 
obligations binding on Australia. Richardson v. Forestry Commission[26] established 
that the federal government can take reasonably necessary interim action while 
determining the extent of a treaty obligation. Queensland v Commonwealth[27] held, 
in the context of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Preservation of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, that the federal government has the power 
to evaluate and submit property it believes to be world heritage for inclusion in the 
World Heritage List, and that the status of a property so listed is not reviewable by a 
court as a question of fact.[28] One commentator has rightly concluded that "the broad 
view of the treaty power is now beyond challenge: the real issue now is to determine 
the implications, and the parameters, of the broad view."[29] 
 
The power to enact laws implementing a treaty is meaningless in the absence of a 
means of enforcement and a method of intra- and inter-government coordination. The 
most efficient method of enforcement and coordination is through a dedicated 
centralized authority. A single centralized authority can avoid duplicative or 
inconsistent standards, jurisdictional rivalry, and economic competition which may be 
a problem with multiple regional authorities. Accordingly, a federal EPA, dedicated to 
enforcing and coordinating Australia's international environmental obligations, is not 
only crucial to the implementation of environmental treaties, but is also the most 
efficient mechanism for ensuring that treaty obligations are observed. 
 
 
C. Federal EPA Oversight of International Responsibilities 
 
The need for a federal EPA flows from the proposition that the states within a 
federation lack international personality and the capacity to enter into international 
treaties.[30] International obligations undertaken by the Nation qua Nation should be 
administered at a national level.[31] 
 
The controversy in Queensland[32] is a prime example of the problems that a state, as 
part of a federation, may create when attempting to involve itself in the international 
environmental regulatory process. During the course of the Commonwealth's attempt 
to place a rainforest in northeastern Queensland on the World Heritage List, 
Queensland sought to intercede in international fora to challenge the listing.[33] At a 
IUCN meeting in Costa Rica and a World Heritage Bureau meeting in Paris, 
Queensland submitted a report to the IUCN that apparently was not considered.[34] 
Queensland also met with a cool reception in Paris, because the World Heritage Bureau 
does not provide for a state within a federal system to advocate a position before it.[35] 
 
The increasing international and internal interdependence of the affairs of a 
nation-state requires a unitary policy. Confidence is hardly engendered by a nation that 
appears schizophrenic about, or unable to meet, its international obligations, with 
constituent states able to override or substantially impair national decisions. The 
efficient discharge of international obligations will only result from a single, consistent 
system. A federal EPA provides such a system. 
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In addition, implementation of international agreements binding the nation demands a 
single uniform rule applicable nationally.[36] Indeed, to the extent that 
Commonwealth legislation is permitted under its external affairs power,[37] any 
inconsistent state legislation will be rendered nugatory.[38] 
 
The general need for uniformity has been recognized on a regional international level 
by the European Community. The Treaty of Rome[39] emphasizes the need to 
eliminate "disparit[ies] between the legislative or administrative provisions of the 
Member States."[40] In the environmental context, the European Community recently 
approved a directive that not only enhances uniformity within nations, but also 
between states, in connection with reporting procedures.[41] The measure standardizes 
reporting requirements and introduces a common reporting procedure in connection 
with air, water and waste regulations that are governed by more than thirty existing 
European Community directives.[42] The directive is designed to make "the reporting 
obligations of member states more systematic and more coherent."[43] 
 
The practical benefits of uniform national regulation of international standards were 
recognized in R. v. Burgess ex parte Henry.[44] Burgess involved a challenge to 
federal regulations purporting to implement the provisions of the Paris Convention for 
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919.[45] In concluding that the power to 
promulgate the regulations fell within the external affairs power, Justice Dixon 
reasoned that "uniformity" of international aircraft regulations enhanced safety, 
regularity, and the efficiency of aviation generally.[46] These salutary objectives 
would also undoubtedly be served by uniform regulation of international 
environmental obligations. 
 
Economic considerations also support the need for uniform national standards 
implementing international environmental agreements. In the absence of national 
regulation, an Australian state that takes it upon itself to protect its environment runs 
the risk of being placed at a competitive disadvantage through increased costs.[47] In 
choosing to enact provisions to protect the environment, a state will inevitably consider 
the increased costs on its economy. Whether the costs are borne by producers, 
consumers, or taxpayers, a state will feel burdensome economic consequences if it 
passes environmental legislation. Without national standards, states are apt to adopt a 
"tragedy of the commons" mentality[48] and inadequate protection will be adopted. 
 
Parochialism is an additional reason for uniform national regulation. In competing with 
each other for industry and development investment, Australian states are often 
tempted to lower costs through lax environmental regulation, or worse, no regulation 
at all. Waste also results from state rivalry because a disadvantaged state will forego 
the full economic rent for the use of its resources in order to attract investment. By 
contrast, the federal government tends to maintain a national perspective. It is less 
politically dependent upon the support of any single region and is more appropriately 
equipped to enforce international standards of environmental management. 
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The disparity of wealth among Australian states also militates in favor of national 
supervision.[49] In order to generate revenue, a financially strapped state may 
welcome, through inadequate legislation, the transfer of environmentally hazardous 
substances, activities, or facilities that a more affluent state can afford to legislate 
against. In a national context, there is no reason for the citizens of one state to bear 
more environmental risks than those of another. National supervisory control of 
international obligations would diminish the chances of this happening. The 
implementation of Australia's international obligations in relation to the environment 
are likely to be complex. State environmental agencies must continue to play an 
important role in delegable functions such as licensing and inspection. Nevertheless, a 
national agency is crucial to overall enforcement and coordination of environmental 
protection in Australia. 
 
D. Substantive Areas of International Environmental Law 
 
Three important international environmental regimes in which Australia participates, 
together with the conventions that bind Australia, provide an illustration of the need for 
a national environmental protection authority. 
 
1. Hazardous Waste 
 
The intractable nature of hazardous waste makes it an especially dangerous threat to 
the environment.[50] It was recognized as an international problem in the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal.[51] The Basel Convention acknowledges "the growing threat to human 
health and the environment posed by the increased generation and complexity, and 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes."[52] 
 
The most effective way to avoid the dangers of hazardous waste is to reduce their 
generation. In lieu of reduction, the Convention establishes a framework for promoting 
safe shipment and disposal of such wastes across national boundaries.[53] One of the 
major shortcomings of the Convention is insufficient provisions for monitoring 
compliance and enforcement. For now, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
provide most of the compliance monitoring and enforcement of the Convention.[54] 
 
Australia responded to the Basel Convention at the national level, with passage of the 
Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989.[55] To import or 
export hazardous waste, as defined in the Basel Convention, a person must apply to the 
responsible Minister for a permit. The Minister considers whether the waste will be 
disposed of safely and will not "pose a significant risk of injury or damage to human 
beings or to the environment.[56] 
 
There is little doubt that a centralized environmental agency would enhance the 
implementation of the Basel and SPREP Conventions, as well as compliment the new 
Commonwealth Industrial Chemicals (Notification and Assessment) Act 1989 and the 
Commonwealth Notification and Assessment Scheme.[57] The Act and Scheme, 
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which became operative in July 1990, require manufacturers or importers of industrial 
chemicals to give notice of the introduction of a new chemical and to submit data that 
will allow an objective assessment of health and safety risks to humans and the 
environment.[58] Depending on the evaluation the risks, an assessment certificate may 
or may not issue.[59] The Act and Scheme are currently administered at the national 
level through a number of bodies. 
 
Given the national importance of the control of hazardous substances and its 
international ramifications, hazardous waste is especially appropriate for regulation by 
a federal environmental protection authority. The need for the development of a 
national comprehensive waste management strategy in Australia in order to comply 
with the obligations imposed under the Basel Convention has been recognized.[60] An 
adequately funded authority would be able to establish a nationwide tracking system 
with sufficient monitoring and enforcement capabilities to ensure effective 
regulation.[61] 
 
2. Atmospheric Protection 
 
Ozone depletion, greenhouse gases, and atmospheric pollution are increasing global 
problems. Effective control requires a concerted effort by all nations. The Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer[62] and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer[63] are the landmark international 
agreements on protection of the ozone layer. 
 
The history of the Montreal Protocol demonstrates the importance of building 
scientific consensus and the need to develop a commonly accepted body of data and 
analysis. The Protocol uses three kinds of provisions as economic incentives to 
encourage participation and compliance with the control regime. They are entry into 
force requirements, controls on trade with nonparties, and research and technology 
transfer benefits.[64] 
 
As a party to that Protocol, Australia has an obligation to work toward effective 
compliance. In order to satisfy this obligation the Commonwealth passed the Ozone 
Protection Act 1989. In fact, the legislation goes beyond what is required of Australia 
as a signatory to the Protocol.[65] Generally, the Act is designed to restrict the use of 
(and ultimately phase out) five types of chlorinated fluorocarbons and three forms of 
halons that are known to cause ozone depletion.[66] 
 
The types of measures necessary to achieve compliance with Australia's international 
obligations require a concerted effort at a national level. The Commonwealth's efforts 
will be hampered if a concurrent system of licensing at the state level is operating 
inconsistently.[67] A federal environmental protection authority is well suited to 
oversee the international duties imposed on Australia under the Vienna Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol. 
 
3. Marine Pollution 
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Marine pollution is another threat to the global commons and has substantial impacts 
within territorial waters. Dumping of waste in the oceans has been recognized as an 
international problem since at least 1926 when an international conference in the 
United States elaborated provisions for an unsuccessful treaty to limit the discharge of 
oil and gas into the sea.[68] It was not until 1954, however, that the international 
community put its first convention to protect the marine environment into effect.[69] 
 
A heightened environmental awareness, coupled with the 1967 Torrey Canyon tanker 
accident, led to measures to protect the sea from marine pollution. The International 
Maritime Organization drafted two conventions for this purpose in 1969. One imposed 
civil liability for oil pollution damage,[70] and the other related to intervention on the 
high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties.[71] 
 
The dumping of wastes in the oceans was recognized as an international problem in the 
1972 London Dumping Convention.[72] This treaty prohibits the deliberate disposal of 
dangerous wastes, including plastics and other persistent synthetic materials, that float 
or remain suspended in marine waters.[73] For less harmful substances, a license must 
be obtained. The purpose of the Convention is "to promote effective control of all 
sources of marine pollution." Additionally, the Convention seeks to prevent "ocean 
pollution caused by dumping of waste and other matter that may create hazards to 
human health, impact on living marine resources, damage amenities, or hinder 
legitimate uses of the sea."[74] The Convention accomplishes this by providing 
nation-states with the authority to regulate the deliberate ocean-dumping of marine 
wastes.[75] The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) "seeks to eliminate intentional pollution of the marine environment with 
oil and other harmful substances and to minimize the accidental discharge of such 
substances."[76] 
 
Australia is a party to both of these treaties. The nation's commitment to the marine 
environment has been further demonstrated by the decision to sign the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III. UNCLOS obligates signatory states to 
"protect and preserve the marine environment." It directs states to pass laws that will 
prevent, avoid, diminish, and control pollution of the marine environment from ocean 
dumping.[77] Although UNCLOS has not entered into force, Australia's signatory 
status is an international statement of commitment to protecting the marine 
environment.[78] State jurisdictional borders are especially inappropriate constraints 
on the marine environment. A federal approach is the most realistic way to effectively 
regulate an ecosystem which wraps around the entire continent of Australia. 
 
E. Measuring Future Effectiveness--International Standards to Work By 
 
Two important general principles of environmental regulation should guide a national 
agency in the performance of its duties: the precautionary principle and the polluter 
pays principle. Both principles are gaining increased acceptance on an international 
level. Some commentators consider these principles essential to the success of any 
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environmental protection.[79] Effective use of these principles also depends on the 
establishment of a strong federal EPA. 
 
1. The Precautionary Principle 
 
The term "precautionary principle" has appeared with an increasing frequency in the 
academic literature[80] and official documents[81] of international environmental law. 
It denotes a general notion that it is desirable to prevent pollution and that States should 
act with care in making decisions that could adversely impact the environment. 
 
Beyond this general notion, the precautionary principle holds that "substances or 
activities that may be harmful to the environment should be regulated even if 
conclusive scientific evidence of their harmfulness is not as yet available."[82] The 
legal ramifications of the principle involve shifting the burden of proof, from those 
supporting environmental regulation to those engaged in the activity being opposed, to 
establish that such activities would not adversely affect the environment. 
 
The precautionary principle arises in the context of international environmental 
agreements because these agreements ordinarily respond to scientific evidence of an 
environmental problem. Unfortunately, scientific evidence is rarely, if ever, absolute. 
This places nation-states in a dilemma. On one hand, negotiators need sufficient and 
accurate data to understand complex environmental problems and to formulate 
effective solutions. On the other hand, if negotiators wait until perfect scientific 
evidence is available, the problem may have worsened or become irreversible.[83] The 
precautionary principle compels States to act in the face of scientific uncertainty to 
safeguard the environment. 
 
The precautionary principle has potential for application in domestic law. It clearly 
demands a measure of care and foresight that require the integration of environmental 
concern into every aspect of governance. Before undertaking any decision that may be 
harmful to the environment, governmental authority must pause and consider the 
consequences.[84] To ensure a fully informed decision, the principle necessitates 
coordination among all levels of government. It is readily apparent that this principle 
of international environmental law favors a centralized authority and a federal EPA is 
the most appropriate mechanism to ensure the precautionary approach to 
environmental regulation is carried out. 
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2. The Polluter Pays Principle 
 
Natural resources exploitation is often described in terms of the "tragedy of the 
Commons" analogy.[85] Overuse of a common natural area benefits each user in the 
short term with only diffuse costs. However, unchecked cumulative use will eventually 
lead to the destruction of the area. Where pollution is involved, the problem is a 
function of a market system which permits external detrimental effects to the 
environment to be excluded from production costs.[86] 
 
The polluter pays principle requires that all costs, including costs to the environment, 
be included in decision-making processes. This ensures that environmental 
degradation caused by the production, use, and disposal of certain activities is 
incorporated into production costs. Various economic approaches facilitate this 
internalization, such as setting standards, which the polluter then pays the cost of 
meeting; instituting charges for input and product manufacture; and setting standards 
and issuing pollution permits, which can then be sold or traded.[87] 
 
The Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle are important to the 
national and international policy objectives of a national environmental protection 
agency. 
 
III. NEED FOR A UNIFIED APPROACH 
 
Australia needs a unified approach to enforcement and coordination of international 
environmental protection and pollution control obligations. One way to achieve this is 
through a national environment agency similar to the U.S. EPA. Establishing such an 
agency in Australia is challenging, but possible, if the federal government is 
sufficiently determined, and the federal departments which currently fulfill these 
functions can relinquish some responsibility. An effective EPA must have clear legal 
authority, adequate resources, a commitment to credible enforcement measures, and a 
system which involves the public and NGOs at all levels. 
 
The evolving dynamic in the relationship between the federal and state governments 
will be a significant issue in Australia if a federal environmental agency is established. 
Australian federal and state governments will need to consider how the respective 
governmental systems are to relate with a federal agency introduced into the 
environmental arena. 
 
There are other challenges to consider in conjunction with establishing a national 
environment agency. For example, mediation and other conflict resolution mechanisms 
are only just developing in Australia,[88] but have been flourishing in the United 
States,[89] and Canada to a lesser extent. The Australian government has allocated 
funds in its 1991-92 budget for the establishment of a national Environment Protection 
Authority. At present the proposed agency appears more modest and less powerful than 
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the models pressed on the government by some non-government organizations and 
legal academics. The actual operation of the agency will have to be closely monitored 
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1. While the authors believe that effective environmental regulation on a planetary 
basis is necessary to combat environmental problems having global impact (i.e. global 
warming, ozone depletion, transboundary pollution, etc.), it is well to keep in mind 
Wendell Berry's admonition about the futility of global thinking. Berry keeps the 
proper focus on seemingly global environmental problems by emphasizing that "[t]he 
question that must be addressed...is not how to care for the planet but how to care for 
each of the planet's millions of human and natural neighborhoods, each of its millions 
of small pieces and parcels of land, each one of which is in some precious way different 
from all the others. Our understandable wish to preserve the planet must somehow be 
reduced to the scale of our competence - that is, to the wish to preserve all of its humble 
households and neighborhoods." Wendell Berry, The Futility of Global Thinking, 279 
HARPER'S, Sept. 1989 at 16, 18 (emphasis in original). 
 
2. See generally ROBERT BOARDMAN GLOBAL REGIMES AND 
NATION-STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS 97 
(1990). Boardman documents the early interplay between the Commonwealth and state 
governments in national and international environmental policy-making. 
 
3. Ratification of a treaty is not enough to make it effective in Australian municipal law, 
and no distinction is made between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. 
Rather, no treaty to which Australia is a state party will have internal effect until it is 
incorporated into domestic law by legislative enactment. Polities v. Commonwealth, 
70 C.L.R. 60 (1945 Austl.); Chow Hung Ching v. R., 77 C.L.R. 449 (1948 Austl.); 
Bradley v. Commonwealth, 128 C.L.R. 557 (1973 Austl.). See IAN BROWNLIE. 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATlONAL LAW 43-48 (4th ed. 1990). 
 
4. See infra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 





5. See infra note 37 for a list of other constitutional powers the Commonwealth has 
relied on in implementing international environmental agreements. 
 
6. See COLIN HOWARD AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
490-92 (3d ed. 1985); P.H. LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION 99-103 (2d ed. 1977). 
 
7. The Australian Environmental Council and the Council of Nature Conservation 
Ministers were established early on to smooth out federal and state environmental 
relations. In general, both bodies sought to coordinate Australia-wide environmental 
policy making by including federal and state officials in the decision process. This 
framework was vital in the area of the of implementation of international 
environmental agreements. BOARDMAN, supra note 2, at 107. The Commonwealth 
government of Australia recently entered into an environmental intergovernmental 
agreement with the states. See Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, May 
1992 (available from the Australian Department of Arts, Sport, the Environment and 
Territories). Schedule 4 of the Agreement purports to create a National Environment 
Protection Authority (National EPA) composed of federal and state Ministers with the 
power to promulgate national environment protection standards. While many of the 
powers and duties of the National EPA appear to coincide with what the authors 
advocate, it is too early to tell how this political body will operate. 
 
8. For extended discussions on the Commonwealth's external affairs power in the 
context of environmental treaties see, P.H. Lane, The Federal Parliament's External 
Affairs Power: The Tasmanian Dam Case, 57 AUSTL. L.J. 554 (1983); Andrew C. 
Byrnes, The Implementation of Treaties in Australia after the Tasmanian Dams Case: 
The External Affairs Power and the Influence of Federalism, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 275, 282-302 (1985). 
 
9. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983) (Austl.). See generally B. Martin 
Tsamenyi, Implementing International Environmental Law in Australia: Queensland v. 
The Commonwealth, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 108 (1990). 
 
10. Many of these treaties, however, contain only a few provisions concerning the 
environment. ALEXANDER KISS AND DINAH SHELTON INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 96 (1991). 
 
11. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treaties Relating to the Environment 
and Conservation to Which Australia is a Party, (July 8, 1992) (unpublished document 
available from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra) (listing 85 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, dating from 1924 to present). See also Australian 
National Report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
173-74 (July 30, 1991) (unpublished public discussion draft on file with the authors). 
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12. The United Nations General Assembly holds a major conference on the 
environment every ten years. This commenced in 1972 with the Stockholm Conference 
at which the seminal Stockholm Declaration was produced. The 1992 conference in 
Rio de Janeiro was estimated to be the largest high level diplomatic conference ever 
held and culminated in several important conventions and documents, including the 
Biodiversity Convention, the Global Warming Conventions, non-binding Principles on 
the Forests, and Agenda 21. See generally 2 AGENDA 21 AND UNCED 
PROCEEDINGS (Nicholas A. Robinson, ed.) (1992). 
 
13. The major regional treaties on the environment include: 
 
-The Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment 
of the South Pacific, Nov. 24, 1986, entered into force Aug. 22, 1990, Austl. T. 
S. No. 31 (1990) SPREP Convention. The SPREP Convention is a 
comprehensive umbrella agreement for the protection, management and 
development of the marine and coastal environment of the South Pacific region. 
The Convention contains provisions relating to the regulation of land-based 
sources, pollution from sea-bed activities and airborne pollution and the storage 
of toxic and hazardous chemicals. 
 
-Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the 
South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, entered into force Aug. 22, 1990, Austl. 
T. S. No. 32 (1990), and the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
South Pacific Region by Dumping, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987) (both 
protocol under the SPREP Convention). 
 
-Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific, June 12, 1976, 
entered into force June 6, 1990 (Apia Convention) Austl. T.S. No. 4 (1990). 
The Apia Convention is probably less significant as a regional convention. It 
has only been signed by five countries, its terminology relating to the 
preservation of natural areas is inappropriate for many customary land 
ownership systems which exist in countries the Pacific region, rendering its 
implementation difficult. It is also likely to be superseded by the global 
Biodiversity Convention. Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/Bio.Div/CONF L.2 (22 May 1992), The Biodiversity Convention is one 
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